The admissibility of the first question
16
IFN-Holding and the European Commission contend that the first question is not admissible, since the reasons for which the referring court needs a response to that question in order to resolve the dispute brought before it, do not appear to be clear.
17
Referring to the judgment in
P
(C‑6/12, EU:C:2013:525, paragraph 39
), IFN-Holding claims, in particular, that, in State aid cases, the sole task of the national courts is to safeguard the rights of individuals until the final decision is taken by the Commission, pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU. That is not the situation in the present case, since none of the parties to the dispute in the main proceedings had introduced a claim on the basis of Article 107 TFEU et seq.
18
The Commission, for its part, considers that IFN-Holding and IFN could not, in any event, plead before the national court, that the rule set out in Paragraph 9(7) of the Law on Corporation Tax of 1988 was unlawful in the light of the law relating to State aid.
19
It must be borne in mind that a request for a preliminary ruling made by a national court may be declared inadmissible only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought is unrelated to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, judgment in
Belvedere Costruzioni
, C‑500/10, EU:C:2012:186, paragraph 16
and the case-law cited).
20
The first question concerns the compatibility with Articles 107 and 108(3) TFEU of a fiscal measure, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, permitting, subject to certain conditions, a company, which acquires a holding in a resident company, to depreciate the goodwill.
21
It must, however, be pointed out, that those liable to pay a tax cannot rely on the argument that a fiscal measure enjoyed by other businesses constitutes State aid in order to avoid payment of that tax (see, to that effect, judgment in
Air Liquide Industries Belgium
, C‑393/04 and C‑41/05, EU:C:2006:403, paragraph 43
).
22
In addition, the order for reference contains no information from which it could be inferred that, despite it being impossible for IFN and IFN-Holding to draw any benefit from a possible breach of Articles 107 and 108(3) TFEU, the answer to the first question would none the less be necessary for the referring court in order for it to resolve the dispute before it.
23
In those conditions, it must be held that it is manifestly clear that the first question bears no relation to the subject-matter of the main proceedings.
24
The first question is consequently inadmissible.
The second question
25
By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 49 TFEU precludes legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in the context of the taxation of a group of companies, allows a parent company, in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a resident company which becomes a member of such a group, to depreciate the goodwill up to a maximum of 50% of the purchase price of the holding, while such depreciation is prohibited in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a non-resident company.
26
Whilst the provisions of the FEU Treaty concerning freedom of establishment are directed to ensuring that foreign nationals and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment in another Member State of a company incorporated under its legislation, in particular through a subsidiary. In particular, freedom of establishment is hindered if, under a Member State’s legislation, a resident company having a subsidiary in another Member State or in another State that is party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992 (OJ 1994 L 1, p. 3), suffers a disadvantageous difference in treatment for tax purposes compared with a resident company having a subsidiary in the first Member State (see, to that effect, judgment in
Nordea Bank
, C‑48/13, EU:C:2014:2087, paragraphs 18 and 19
).
27
It must be found that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings creates a tax advantage for a parent company acquiring a holding in a resident company, in cases of positive goodwill. As the referring court observes, the fact of being able to depreciate the goodwill, within the meaning of Paragraph 9(7) of the Law on Corporation Tax of 1988, reduces the basis of assessment for tax purposes of the parent company, and hence the tax burden.
28
By not granting, in those circumstances, that tax advantage to a parent company which acquires a holding in a non-resident company, that legislation introduces a difference in tax treatment between parent companies to the detriment of those which acquire a holding in a non-resident company.
29
That difference in treatment is such as to hinder the exercise by the parent company which acquires a holding in a non-resident company of its freedom of establishment for the purposes of Article 49 TFEU by deterring it from acquiring or setting up subsidiaries in other Member States (see, to that effect, judgment in
Commission v United Kingdom
, C‑172/13, EU:C:2015:50, paragraph 23
and the case-law cited).
30
Such a difference in treatment is permissible only if it relates to situations which are not objectively comparable or if it is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (see, inter alia, judgment in
Nordea Bank
, C‑48/13, EU:C:2014:2087, paragraph 23
).
31
As regards the question whether the situations at issue are objectively comparable, it must be recalled that the comparability of a cross-border situation with an internal situation must be examined having regard to the aim pursued by the national provisions at issue (judgment in
Commission v Finland
, C‑342/10, EU:C:2012:688, paragraph 36
and the case-law cited).
32
As the Verwaltungsgerichtshof states in its order for reference, by adopting the Tax Reform Law of 2005, the Austrian legislature intended to create a tax incentive for the creation of groups of companies by ensuring equal treatment between the purchase of the establishment (‘asset deal’) and the purchase of the holding in the company that owns the establishment (‘share deal’).
33
However, where, by virtue of legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, a group of companies can be composed of both resident and non-resident companies the situation of a parent company wishing to form such a group with a resident subsidiary and the situation of a resident parent company wishing to form a group of companies with a non-resident subsidiary are objectively comparable with regard to the aim of a tax scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in so far as each seeks to benefit from the advantages of that scheme (see, to that effect, judgment in
X Holding
, C‑337/08, EU:C:2010:89, paragraph 24
).
34
That finding is not undermined by the existence, referred to by the Republic of Austria, of a difference in the attribution, to the earnings of the parent company, of the profits and losses of resident subsidiaries, on the one hand, and non-resident subsidiaries, on the other hand, in the context of the taxation of a group of companies.
35
As the referring court points out, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings allows the parent company to depreciate the goodwill, irrespective of whether the company in which a holding is acquired makes a profit or incurs a loss.
36
In those circumstances, as stated by the Advocate General in point 40 of her Opinion, the attribution, or absence of attribution to the earnings of a parent company, of the profits and losses of a company in which a holding is acquired cannot be regarded as a relevant criterion in order to compare the situation of the two categories of parent companies concerned in relation to the aim pursued by legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
37
The finding set out in paragraph 33 above is not called into question by the argument of the Republic of Austria that the objective of legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is to give the ‘share deal’ the same treatment as that accorded to the ‘asset deal’. According to that Member State, allowing the parent company, in the event of the acquisition of a holding in a non-resident company which becomes a member of a group of companies, to depreciate the value of the company would place, in a cross-border situation, the ‘share deal’ in a more favourable position than the ‘asset deal’.
38
Even assuming that that were the case, the fact remains that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings creates a difference in treatment between a parent company acquiring a holding in a resident company, on the one hand, and a parent company acquiring a holding in a non-resident company, on the other hand, even though those two categories of companies are in a comparable situation in the light of that legislation’s very objective which is, as is clear from paragraph 32 above, to create a tax incentive for the creation of groups of companies.
39
The difference in treatment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, can therefore be justified only by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that that difference in treatment be appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective that it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (see judgment in
Nordea Bank Danmark
, C‑48/13, EU:C:2014:2087, paragraph 25
and the case-law cited).
40
The Republic of Austria considers that the difference in treatment, established by legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is justified by the principle of the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States, since it does not have the power to impose taxes on the profits of non-resident companies which are members of a group of companies.
41
In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures of the European Union, the Member States retain the power to define, by treaty or unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation, particularly with a view to eliminating double taxation, and that preservation of that allocation is a legitimate objective recognised by the Court (see judgment in
Nordea Bank Danmark
, C‑48/13, EU:C:2014:2087, paragraph 27
and the case-law cited).
42
However, as was noted in paragraph 35 above, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings allows the parent company to depreciate the goodwill, irrespective of whether the company in which a holding is acquired makes a profit or incurs a loss. Regarding the granting of that tax advantage, that legislation concerns neither the exercise of the power to impose taxes in respect of the profits and losses of the company in which a holding is acquired, nor, consequently, the allocation of the power to impose taxes between the Member States.
43
The Republic of Austria also submits that the difference in treatment arising from legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system.
44
Admittedly, the Court has already recognised that the need to maintain the cohesion of a tax system can justify a restriction on the exercise of the freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty. For an argument based on such a justification to succeed, the Court requires, however, that a direct link be established between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy, with the direct nature of that link falling to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rules in question (judgment in
Grünewald
, C‑559/13, EU:C:2015:109, paragraph 48
and the case-law cited).
45
The Republic of Austria contends, first, that such a direct link exists, under legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, between the tax advantage consisting in the depreciation of the goodwill, on the one hand, and the tax attribution to the parent company of the results of the resident company, on the other hand.
46
Such an argument cannot, however, be accepted. For the same reason as already set out in paragraphs 35 and 42 above, it cannot be considered that there is a direct link between that tax advantage and the tax burden consisting of the tax attribution to the parent company of the profit made by the company in which a holding is acquired, even assuming that that latter company makes in all circumstances profits and not losses.
47
Second, the Republic of Austria argues that there is a direct link, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 44 above, between the tax advantage concerned, on the one hand, and the taxation in so far as concerns the parent company of the capital gain realised upon the disposal of a holding in the resident company, on the other hand. Where the holding of a parent company in a non-resident company is fiscally neutral, such taxation does not occur, and therefore not granting the tax advantage directly linked to the same taxation is justified.
48
However, it should be noted, first, that the tax advantage consisting of the depreciation of the goodwill produces immediate effects for the parent company, while the taxation of the capital gains realised upon the disposal of the investment in the resident company is remote and uncertain. The referring court notes, moreover, in that regard that strategic holdings are generally held for the long term. In those conditions, the fact that it is possible to tax capital gains realised upon a disposal of the holding is not such as to constitute a consideration based on fiscal cohesion justifying a refusal to grant that tax advantage where a parent company acquires a holding in a non-resident company which becomes a member of a group of companies (see, to that effect, judgments in
Rewe Zentralfinanz
, C‑347/04, EU:C:2007:194, paragraph 67
, and
DI. VI. Finanziaria di Diego della Valle & C., C‑380/11, EU:C:2012:552, paragraph 49
).
49
Second, as the Advocate General noted in point 61 of her Opinion, the national law does not allow the parent company to depreciate the goodwill even where the parent company exercises its option to have a foreign holding taken into account for tax purposes, in accordance with Paragraph 10(3), point 1, of the Law on Corporation Tax of 1988 and, thus rendering the disposal of such a holding taxable.
50
It follows that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not, by itself, establish a direct link between, first, the tax advantage consisting of the depreciation of the goodwill and, second, the levy consisting of the taxation in so far as concerns the parent company of the capital gain realised upon the disposal of a holding in its subsidiary, such that it could not be considered that difference in treatment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, is justified by the need to ensure the coherence of the tax system of the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, judgment in
Commission v Spain
, C‑269/09, EU:C:2012:439, paragraph 87
).
51
Third, according to the Republic of Austria, it is permissible, in order to preserve the cohesion of the Austrian tax system, which prohibits the deduction of expenses related to non-taxable receipts, to deny the advantages of the depreciation referred to above in the case of tax neutral holdings in non-resident companies. Otherwise, those holdings would benefit from a double advantage, which is incompatible with that system.
52
However, that argument, founded on a lack of power to impose taxes in respect of the benefits of non-resident companies, does not concern the existence of a direct link between an advantage and a levy, but is the same, in fact, as that based on the principle of the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States, mentioned in paragraph 40 above. That argument must therefore be rejected for the same reason as that referred to in paragraph 42 above.
53
Since it is not apparent from the documents before the Court that a difference in treatment, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, would be justified by an overriding reason of general interest, it must be considered incompatible with the freedom of establishment.
54
Consequently, the answer to the second question is that Article 49 TFEU precludes legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, in the context of the taxation of a group of companies, allows a parent company, in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a resident company which becomes a member of such a group, to depreciate the goodwill up to a maximum of 50% of the purchase price of the holding, while such depreciation is prohibited in the case of the acquisition of a holding in a non-resident company.